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"A" Is for Anachronism: The FTAIA Meets
the World Trading System
Sall K. Mehra*
I.

Introduction

Maybe statutes, like volcanoes, often act up when they are not
expected to.'
But volcanoes 'and statutes are technically inanimate; human
expectations about volcanoes and judicial statutory interpretation is what
causes surprise. A decade ago, after Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
2 commentators
California,
by and large echoed a single criticism: The
death of interest-balancing 3 meant that courts were left with no choice
but to apply the Sherman Act to foreign conduct in a manner that would
create foreign relations trouble for the United States.4
* Assistant Professor, Temple University, Beasley School of Law. Thanks to
Bruce Carolan, William Dodge, Beth Farmer, Sharon Foster, Eleanor Fox, William
Kovacic, and Spencer Weber Waller for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to
Sarah Beth Mehra for her editing skills and loving support. This article is an expanded
version of remarks given at the American Association of Law Schools annual meeting on
January 4, 2003.
1. David Winder, A Volcano That Surprised Everyone, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Apr. 14, 1980, at 15 (discussing eruption of Mount St. Helens, previously thought
inactive).
2. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
3. Or near-death. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 564 (2000) (describing Hartford Fire as dealing a "near death
blow" to comity); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a
Global Age: Public Interests in Private InternationalAntitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J.
INT'L L. 219, 234 (2001) (stating that Hartford Fire "essentially eliminated" comity);
Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and InternationalAntitrust Cases, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L 275, 277 (2002) (stating that Hartford Fire "virtually
eliminated" comity). All the hedging stems from the fact that the opinion leaves open

whether balancing would be appropriate if a "true conflict" as defined by the Court-a
situation in which an actor could not comply with the laws of both sovereigns-existed.
See HartfordFire Ins. Co.,. 509 U.S. at 798-99.
4. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: A
Postscript on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 213, 225
(1993); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritorialityin an Age of Globalization: The Hartford
Fire Case, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 289, 328 (1993).
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Perhaps fear of an unbridled effects approach was well founded. 5
But, a decade after HartfordFire,a single word in a dormant statute that
was briefly mentioned in the majority opinion has created a split-or
possibly multiple splits-among American courts as to whether federal
antitrust law applies to conduct involving foreign trade. Given the
growth of foreign trade and the importance of antitrust law, resolving the
split to avoid ambiguity involving Sherman Act jurisdiction could be a
compelling interest in and of itself.
But there are other, more important concerns as well. The issue at
stake is essentially whether plaintiffs injured by the non-United States
effects of anti-competitive conduct (foreign-injured plaintiffs) that also
had effects on United States commerce can maintain damages actions in
American courts. The overwhelming number of decisions on this issue
run in one direction; however, the two decisions that countervail are6
notably from the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit.

And, although the split at stake is based on statutory language, neither
the language nor the legislative history of the statute compels any of the
judicial conclusions so far.7
Given the apparent indeterminacy of the relevant statutory text and
legislative history, the resolution of this conflict inevitably must turn on
policy grounds. And how the Supreme Court finally answers this
question will impact three issues important to antitrust and the world
trade regime. First, the resolution will determine how wide a scope of
allies that American antitrust agencies will have; this aspect of United
States antitrust law has attracted recent attention, and imitation, abroad.
Second, it may establish whether, when it comes to private enforcement,
the United States antitrust regime will have overlapping enforcement
power with other national antitrust regimes-or whether national

5. Not all applications of the "effects" approach that impact foreign relations are
the product of American prosecutors or plaintiffs. See, e.g., Neal R. Stoll & Shepard
Goldfein, A Tale of Two Regulators, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 2001, at 3.

6. Indeed, opinions on both sides argue that they are compelled by "plain meaning"
and legislative history. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338,
349 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (observing that the preceding opinions of "the Second Circuit and
the Fifth Circuit found the [language of the statute] to be plain in opposite ways") (citing
Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002); Den Norske Stats
Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom.
Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002)); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Latin
Am. Imps., S.A., 227 F. Supp. 2d 685 (W.D. Ky. 2002); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715-716 (D. Md. 2001); Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129
F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.
2002); Ferromin Int'l Trade v. UCAR Int'l Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Pa.
2001); In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875 (W.D. Wis. 2001), aff'd sub
nom. Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2002).
7. See infra Part 11.
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antitrust regimes will have "exclusive," non-overlapping jurisdiction.
Finally, courts favoring the narrower reading have relied on the concept
of being injured in a hypothetical "American marketplace"--a creative
fiction that appears to represent an attempt to reinvigorate a territorial
notion of sovereignty. A resolution to the split could finally do away
with this approach, which already seems doomed to fail by the
complexity of its application and its tension with existing world trade
reality.
Part II outlines the conflict that has emerged. Part III discusses the
policy issues at stake, and a brief conclusion follows.
II.

One Little Word

Three circuit courts have come to strikingly different conclusions
about the impact of Congress's choice of one word in the Foreign Trade
and Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA). Essentially, Congress drafted
the FTAIA as a cut-back of Sherman Act jurisdiction 8 that states that, for
the Sherman Act to apply to conduct involving foreign trade, 9 two
requirements must be fulfilled. The first requirement is a variant of the
familiar "effects" test most famously enunciated in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America.10 The conduct must have a "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States
commerce-that is, on domestic commerce, on imports into the United
States, or on United States-engaged exporters." And, second, "such
effect" must "give[] rise to a claim under" the Sherman Act's substantive
provisions. 12
Although the FTAIA is often criticized for its ungainly syntax and
drafting, 13 the main dispute thus far stems from the second, far less
8. The FTAIA also enacted a similarly worded cut-back to the FTC Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 45a (2000). Although written as a cut-back of jurisdiction, the Court has
recognized that it is "unclear... whether the [FTAIA's] 'direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect' standard amends existing law or merely codifies it."
HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 796 n.23.
9. Other than "import" trade-which is carved out of the cut-back, creating another
issue of interpretation that may in the future create conflict. See Dee-K Enterprises, Inc.
v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd, 299 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that, "[b]ecause this
case involves importation of foreign-made goods, however-conduct Congress expressly
exempted from FTAIA coverage as 'involving... import trade or import commerce...
with foreign nations,'-the FTAIA standard obviously does not directly govern this case,
even though it may constitute an effort to 'clarify the application of United States
antitrust laws to foreign conduct' in other circumstances").
10. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1).
12. Id. § 6a(2).
13. See, e.g., Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 426 n. 19 (stating that it is "difficult" to obtain
a "clear understanding"); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1997) (stating that the provisions are "inelegantly phrased"); Kruman, 129 F. Supp.
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convoluted, of its two prongs. 14 Essentially, the question is whether the
requirement that the domestic effect must give rise to "a claim" means
that the effect must give rise to (1) the plaintiff's Sherman Act claim,
(2) a hypothetical claim by the government to enforce or prevent a
violation of the Sherman Act, or (3) an actual claim by someone other
than the plaintiff under the Sherman Act. Essentially, these are three
different readings of what the word "a" means.
A.

"A Claim'"Means "the Plaintiff's Claim"

Perhaps surprisingly, the first reading has been adopted by the vast
majority of courts to address the issue. 15 Most notably, the Fifth Circuit
in Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof 6 came to the
conclusion that the
"plain language" compelled the conclusion that "a"
17
"the."'
mean
must
The claim of the plaintiff in Den Norske was that, when it paid for
services in connection with offshore oil drilling in the North Sea, it was

at 624 ((stating that the provisions are "not elegantly drafted"); see also MILTON
HANDLER ET AL.,

TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

1197 (4th ed. 1997)

(stating that the provisions are "not destined for a inclusion in a manual of style").

14. The relevant Sherman Act text is set forth as follows:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations
unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign
nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7
of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the
operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to
such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 6a.
15. See, e.g., Den Norske, 241 F.3d 420 (holding that plaintiff must show that a
substantial anticompetitive effect on American commerce "gives rise" to its antitrust
claim); Ferromin Int'l Trade v. UCAR Int'l Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Pa.
2001); Kruman, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 625; see also S. Megga Telecomms. Ltd. v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., No. 96-357-SLR, 1997 WL 86413 (D. Del. Feb. 14, 1997); The In Porters,
S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494 (M.D.N.C. 1987); de Atucha v.
Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Copper Antitrust Litig.,
117 F. Supp. 2d 875 (W.D. Wis. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo
Corp., 306 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2002); infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
16. 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Statoil ASA v. HeereMac
v.o.f., 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
17. Id. at421.
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victimized by the same cartel that also had an anticompetitive effect on
similar commerce involving offshore oil drilling "in the territorial waters
of the United States in the Gulf of Mexico."' 8 Two of the defendants had
already pled guilty to a related criminal complaint filed by the United
States Department of Justice; injured parties other than the plaintiff had
already filed damages complaints based on these American effects.' 9
Thus, it was fairly clear that the same conduct had had an
anticompetitive effect in the United States, and gave rise to "a" claim
under the Sherman Act.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether it was enough that
the "effect" on American commerce-here the anticompetitive effects in
the Gulf of Mexico-gave rise to Sherman Act claims, or whether it was
necessary that the effects gave rise to the plaintiff's claim. 20

The

majority opinion sided with the latter view based on what it saw as the
plain language of the statute, as well as a legislative history, which it
viewed as reinforcing its conclusion. 2 1 The majority was relatively
unconcerned with policy implications, save for an unsupported assertion
that "[a]ny reading of the FTAIA authorizing jurisdiction" in the case
"would open United States courts to global claims on a scale never
intended by Congress. 22
A focused dissent by Judge Higginbotham pointed out that the
majority's "plain language" argument was undercut by the fact that "'a'
has a simple and universally understood meaning" as "the indefinite
article. 23 The dissent, like the majority, was able to point to legislative
history in support of its reading. 24 Notably, the dissent raised a policy
18.
19.
20.

See id at 422-23 & n.8.
Id.at 420.
The court stated that, although the plaintiff "exported an average of 400,000

barrels of oil a day into the United States" in recent years-which incidentally represents
$12 million of imports daily and over $4 billion annually (at $30 per barrel)-the
plaintiff did not "allege any injury to itself derived from its export of oil to the United
States." Id. at 422 n.5. For that reason, presumably, the court was spared from having to
consider whether all or part of the plaintiff's claim could be said to arise from that
domestic effect.
21. Id.at428.
22. Id.at 431; see also id. at 421 (stating that "[t]he plaintiff is a Norwegian oil
corporation that conducts business solely in the North Sea" that "seeks redress under the
United States antitrust laws" and citing Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), to the effect that "United States antitrust laws 'do not
regulate the competitive conditions of other nations' economies').
23. Id. at 432 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]here are many terms of
art about which one can debate whether Congress uses the term as courts do, but this
word is not one of them").
24. Id. at 433 n. II (Higginbotham, J.,dissenting). This is not surprising-any
holistic view of the statute's legislative history makes clear that it contains language to
support both interpretations, and is perhaps intentionallyvague. See Mehra, supra note 3,
at 296-99.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:4

argument to which the majority did not respond: that private enforcement
of United States antitrust laws supplements the efforts of the Justice
Department and that the dissent's reading of the FTAIA "ensures that
parties injured by foreign aspects of the same conspiracy that harms
American commerce are part of the phalanx of enforcers. 2s
B.

"A Claim" Means "Anybody 's Hypothetical Claim, Including the
Government's"

In Kruman v. Christie's InternationalPLC,26 the Second Circuit
sided with the dissent in Den Norske in concluding that the FTAIA's
"language is clear," and that, since "Congress used the indefinite article,"
the "'effect' on domestic commerce need not be the basis for a plaintiffs
injury, it only must violate the substantive provisions of the Sherman
Act.",27 As a result, the court concluded that, where a conspiracy to rig
auctions for art, antiques, and collectibles had effects on United States
commerce, buyers and sellers injured by the foreign effects of that
conspiracy could maintain a Sherman Act claim. 28 The court also
considered the legislative history and the policy interest of making it
hard for violators to use the foreign effects of a worldwide scheme to
supplement the domestic branch of their conspiracy.2 9
Interestingly, the court in Kruman suggested a very wide
interpretation of the second prong of the FTAIA. In particular, the court
concluded that "[t]he language 'gives rise to a claim' only requires that
the 'effect' on domestic commerce violate the substantive provisions the
Sherman Act" and is not actually "predicated on the existence of an
injury to a plaintiff. 30 As a result, a fair interpretation of the Second
Circuit's reading is that a plaintiff whose claim does not arise from the
domestic effect of a conspiracy does not need to show that "the violation
has caused injury to a plaintiff' in particular.3'
C.

"A Claim" Means "Somebody's Private Claim, Including Somebody
Else's"
Three circuit courts, three different readings.

That is the score

25. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 439 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (describing "the
Clayton Act as recruit[ing] private parties [to assist] the Department of Justice").
26. 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
27. Id.at 400.
28. Id.at 403.
29. See id.
at 400, 403.
30. Id.at 399-400.
31. Id.This is also how the District of Columbia Circuit construed Kruman. See
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 351-52 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
32. See also Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumtitomo Corp. of Am., No. 00-3700, 2003
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after the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Empagran S.A. v. F.
Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd.3 3 The court considered whether the FTAIA
permitted subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of foreign
purchasers of vitamin products who alleged injury based on the foreign
effects of a worldwide vitamin cartel that also had adverse effects in the
United States.34
The District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs did have
standing, rejecting the Fifth Circuit majority's conclusion that the FTAIA
requires that their claim must arise from the domestic effects. But,
unlike the Second Circuit, the Empagran court concluded that "'giving
rise to a claim' means giving rise to someone 's private claim for damages
or equitable relief," and, "[t]o satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must
allege that some private person or entity has suffered actual or threatened
injury as a result of the United States effect of the defendant's violation
of the Sherman Act." 35 In other words, even if the plaintiff's claim need
not arise from the domestic effect, there must be a potential Sherman Act
claim that another private party could bring arising from that effect.36
III.

Three Bigger Issues

How these circuit courts got to their various conclusions is
interesting in and of itself. But how the courts read the second prong of
the FTAIA will bear directly on three policy questions that are little
analyzed in these cases, and yet are quite important to how antitrust
policy will operate in the world trade regime. First, who has standingin essence, to whom can the enforcement agencies look as allies against
international cartels? Second, will the private enforcement of United
States antitrust laws be allowed to overlap with the jurisdiction of other
nations? Finally, can the court opinions that favor the narrower reading,
the concept of being injured in a hypothetical "American marketplace,"
be reconciled with a world trading regime?

WL 1665352, at *5 (7th Cir. Mar. 31, 2003) ("Although we need not come to a definitive
resolution of the issue in this case, the [7th Circuit's en banc decision in United
Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003),] appears to

point in the direction of the approach taken by the D.C. and Second Circuit's.").
33. 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
34. ld. at 340.
35. Id.at 352.
36. It is interesting that the District of Columbia Circuit chose to reach the question
of whether or not the claim arising from the United States-related effect needs to be
actual or merely hypothetical given that it recognized that, "[i]n the instant case, the
conspiracy's effects did allegedly injure and did give rise to the claims of some private
entities-namely the domestic plaintiffs who filed suit along with the foreign plaintiffs
against the vitamin companies." Id. at 352.
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Who Will Be the Enforcement Agencies'Allies?
Each of the cases discussed addressed the proposition that private

antitrust actions aid enforcement through increasing deterrence of
potential violators.37 If a plaintiff can bring American treble damages

actions for a claim derived from non-American effects of anticompetitive
conduct that also had American anticompetitive effects, that will serve to
increase the level of deterrence of such antitrust conspiracies.
But the additional deterrence of private actions does not lie merely
in the added cost that a violator must pay when private plaintiffs
piggyback off of previously successful government action. Instead, the
private right of action encourages private plaintiffs to aid and inform

government enforcement agencies-thus providing a force-multiplier to
those agencies' own resources. 38 And, of course, although the evidence
would be hard to obtain, some violators probably are deterred by the
that private claims provide to their victims
knowledge of the incentives
39
co-conspirators.
and their
Recently, European Union and Japanese antitrust regulators have
begun to examine the mechanisms by which they, like their American
counterparts, can find private allies. The European Union has recently
adopted a regulation that clarifies that European Union competition law
can be enforced at the national court level, including through private
actions. 40 Additionally, the European Union has added an amnesty
37. Id. at 355-56 (noting that, in the international context, to eschew such marginal
deterrence by foreign-injured claimants could, as a practical matter, make worldwide
cartels profitable even where they were forced to pay treble damages to United Statesinjured claimants); Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 403 (2d Cir. 2002);
Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 435 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f.,
534 U.S. 1127 (2002). But see id. at 430 n.30 (dismissing this argument based on notion
that it was dicta in a pre-FTAIA Supreme Court case, Pfizer, Inc. v. Government ofIndia,
434 U.S. 308 (1978), without addressing merits of the argument).
38. And indeed, not all private actions can be described as mere piggybacking where
private parties arrive at the scene after the government has made the case. See, e.g.,
Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST 711, 712-13 (2001) (recounting how private plaintiffs'
attorneys gathered information on international vitamin cartel prior to Justice Department
empanelment of a grand jury in an investigation that ultimately led to record-setting civil
penalties).
39. See Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official's Reflections on Antitrust Class
Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 451 (1997) (observing that, even though the same aim of
enhanced deterrence might be achieved by raising public penalties for anticompetitive
conduct, "it is likely that many antitrust class actions still play a useful role, especially
through deterring conduct that stops short of being criminal and through identification of
antitrust violations that might otherwise go unchallenged").
40. See Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of
the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1)
1 (E.C.).
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program that gives conspirators an incentive to inform on each other that
is similar to the revised program adopted by the Justice Department in
1993.41
Similarly, the Japan Fair Trade Commission has lately
recognized the utility of private enforcement, 42 and has made attempts to
seek out such private allies.4 3
Interestingly, at a time when the antitrust enforcers of our major
trading partners are reaching out to their private citizens as allies in
enforcement, the United States could actually be poised to step back
from this position. The resolution of the FTAIA split will determine
whether those same private citizens44 will have the treble damages
incentive under United States law to reach out and help United States
enforcement agencies. Essentially, the question is whether we will be
willing to "purchase" information from these foreign-affected victims of
international cartels.

41. See Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in
Cartel Cases, 2002 O.J. (C 45) 3 (E.C.); see also James M. Griffin, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, Presentation
at the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law 49th Annual Spring Meeting
(Mar.
28,
2001)
(explaining
program),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal/8278.pdf (last visited February 15, 2003).
42. See, e.g., Akio Yamada, Secretary General of the Japan Fair Trade Commission,
Competition Policy in the Future, Address Before the American Chamber of Commerce
(Feb. 2, 2001) (stating that "lawsuits demanding a huge amount of damages are filed after
the FTC issue [s] a cease[] and desist order. I believe that such lawsuits are serving as an
effective deterrent."), availableat htp:/ www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/speech/index.htm.
43. See Jumin e No Kaigon Wa Go Ho-Dango Jihen Meguru Ko Torii Kiroko
[Disclosure of JFTC Documents in Bid-Rigging Case to Residents Lawful], ASAHI
SHIMBUN (Japan), Oct. 18, 2001, at 39 (reporting district court decision upholding JFTC
disclosure of investigation documents to citizens). But see Residents Thwarted in BidRigging Suit: High Court ForbidsFTC Disclosure,JAPAN TIMES, Jun. 6, 2002 (reporting
that appeals court "ordered the Fair Trade Commission not to disclose information about
bid-rigging cases involving five companies to residents in Tokyo and Yokohama who
have sued the firms for damages" despite the FTC's prior decision "to grant partial
disclosure").
44. Although the FTAIA does not mention the citizenship of who may sue, as a
practical matter, those whose claims arise from foreign effects of anticompetitive conduct
are more likely to be foreigners than those whose claims arise from American effects. Cf
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2001). Although, it certainly cannot be said that only Americans have
claims that arise from American effects, and that only foreigners have claims that arise
from non-American effects. Ronald W. Davis, InternationalCartel and Monopolization
Cases Expose a Gap in Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 ANTITRUST 53
(2001).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 107:4

How Much Will PrivateEnforcement of United States Antitrust Laws
Be Allowed To Overlap with the Antitrust Jurisdictionof Other
Nations?

The ascendance of effects-based approaches over territorial ones
makes jurisdictional overlap possible in antitrust. When conduct occurs
in one nation with effects in another-or when effects occur in multiple
nations-the widespread acceptance of the effects test means that several
nations' antitrust regimes may apply concurrently.
The resolution of the FTAIA's "gives rise to a claim" prong will
determine whether the applicability of the effects test to private claims
will be limited in a manner that reduces this overlap. Prior to Hartford
Fire, some courts had adopted an "interest balancing" approach to
allocate jurisdiction to nations with "greater interest" in cases of such
As with territorial approaches, the result is to create
overlap. 45
nonoverlapping jurisdiction for one nation.
Currently, there is an ongoing discussion over whether it is more
efficient to allocate exclusive jurisdiction to one nation, or to allow
concurrent jurisdiction by more than one nation.46 The extent to which
private antitrust actions will be possible in overlapping jurisdictions will
be determined under United States law by which reading of the FTAIA
ultimately triumphs. This result is important for at least two reasons.
First, to the extent that the less plaintiff-friendly reading wins out, the
enforcement agencies will potentially have wider jurisdiction under the
effects test than private plaintiffs, since they will need only to show that
the conduct of which they complain has a United States effect.47
Presumably, unlike private plaintiffs, the agencies would not be subject
to the limiting principle of having to show an injury from the United
States effect.48
45. See William S. Dodge, An Economic Defense of Concurrent Antitrust
Jurisdiction, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27, 30-31 (2003) (asking why "a court [should] even
attempt such an exercise [as interest balancing] if not to assign jurisdiction to the state
with the greater interest").
46. See id. at 39 (arguing that a "system of concurrent antitrust jurisdiction produced
by the effects approach is Pareto efficient and that Pareto efficiency is a more appropriate
standard in th[e] [antitrust] context than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency"). But see Andrew T.
Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations,90 GEO. L.J. 883, 906-09 (2002) (observing
that, with concurrent antitrust jurisdiction, for a "transaction to be permitted, being
globally efficient is not enough, it must improve the welfare of every country
[individually]").
47. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1,4 (1st Cir. 1997).
48. No court has yet concluded that the FTAIA's "gives rise to a claim" language
sets a limit on agency enforcement under the effects test, although the Second Circuit's
opinion in Kruman could be read to do so in the uncontroversial manner of requiring that
the United States-related "effect" be an anticompetitive one of the type that usually
subjects conduct to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC,
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Second, if a similar test is adopted in other jurisdictions that have
private rights of actions, then jurisdiction over private claims would be
apportioned to the nation within whose borders the effects that gave rise
to the injury could be said to be located. As a result, reciprocal adoption
of this test could eliminate overlap, and eliminate competition of antitrust
law regimes, with respect to private rights of action.
C. Can We Just Protect the "United States Marketplace"?
Cases that have adopted the narrower reading of the FTAIA have
placed significant emphasis on a plaintiffs participation in a notional
"United States marketplace., 49 Partly this is due to a line in the statute's
legislative history that mentions the term "domestic marketplace,"
although not with any specific reference to the "gives rise to a claim"
language or any general reference to limiting a class of plaintiffs'
standing. 5° But partly this is because a court that decides to try to limit
jurisdiction based on which of many effects can be said to give rise to the
plaintiff's claim has to create some guiding principle by which to
distinguish a "domestic" effect from a "foreign" one.
The United States marketplace concept has some superficial appeal.
A court might weigh the level of a plaintiffs participation in that
marketplace, and the nexus between that participation and its antitrust
claim. This inquiry could theoretically evolve into something like an
antitrust version of the "contacts" approach to personal jurisdiction. 5'
But there are several ways in which the United States marketplace
approach is difficult to reconcile with a global trading system. First, it
requires definition of the extent of the marketplace: does it just involve
participation in commerce in American territory, or does the United
States marketplace extend to, for example, sales abroad for expected
284 F.3d 384, 403 (2d Cir. 2002). But see United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem.

Co., 322 F.3d 942, 965 (7th Cir. 2003) (Wood, J., dissenting) (asserting that, due to the
court's en banc conclusion that FTAIA should be treated as question of subject matter
jurisdiction, "[t]he [federal] government will not want to conduct criminal antitrust
investigations in the Seventh Circuit").
49. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 429 n.28 (5th
Cir. 2001) (stating that the majority "hold[s] ...that a foreign plaintiff show that its
injuries arise from a United States market"), cert. denied sub nonm. Statoil ASA v.
HeereMac v.o.f., 534 U.S. 1127 (2002); see also In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig.,
127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715-716 (D. Md. 2001) (adopting a "United States marketplace"
participation test together with the less plaintiff-friendly reading of the FTAIA's second
prong).
50. See H.R. REP. 97-686, at 10 (1982) (stating that "foreign purchasers should
enjoy the protection of our antitrust laws in the domestic marketplace, just as our citizens
do").
51. See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d 942 (discussing the defendant's American

activities in a manner that resembles contact analysis).
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United States imports? By what notion, other than territorial jurisdiction,
would this judicially created test exclude the latter? Second, and
relatedly, it requires courts to set up a discrete American marketplace
jurisdictional zone within a world trade regime that is supposed to form
an integrated whole. There is an inherent conceptual tension in this
effort. Then, some notion of participation in that zone must be defined,
including the question of whether only active participation (for example,
sales) would count-as opposed to passive participation (for example, an
agreement of competitors not to sell into the zone). 2 Finally, by doing
so, it creates an incentive for violators to structure their enterprises to
take advantage of the areas outside the "walls" of the patrolled United
States marketplace. This conflicts53 with United States caselaw that has
recognized this danger previously.
IV.

Conclusion

Courts have been handling this statutory question in the way they
know best: looking first to textual language and legislative history, and
only sparingly to policy matters. However, where the former point in
multiple directions, it would appear reasonable to look to policy in a
more in-depth fashion. This is particularly true here, where the same
policy issues are critical to how international antitrust will evolve in the
world trading system. It remains to be seen whether the importance of
these issues will be recognized as this standing issue is resolved.

52. Note that the claim of the plaintiffs in Hartford Fire could be described as
arising from the effect of a foreign agreement not to export a particular type of insurance
coverage to the United States. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993).
53. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997)
(noting potential strategic use of "territorial firewalls" if effects test is narrowed in
criminal antitrust cases); see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314-15
(1978) (observing that if, foreign plaintiffs cannot seek a remedy for their antitrust
injuries, "persons doing business both in this country and abroad might be tempted to
enter into anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expectation
that the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to
plaintiffs at home").

